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Filling the Airpower Vacuum
The United States Air Force (USAF) faces a complex strategic challenge: How to equip the twenty-first century force to meet ever-increasing mission sets with a decreasing budget under an ineffective acquisition program that is increasingly aircraft. The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review then lowered the production number to 339 F-22s to support three F-22 fighter wings. 3 Ultimately, the USAF procured only twenty-five percent of the initial requirement and stopped production after 187 F-22s.
Many believe this number creates a higher level of operational risk. 4 In order to reduce the risk of limited F-22 numbers, the Air Force is looking to the F-35. The F-35 was designed to replace the F-16 and be an economical fifthgeneration fighter. Unfortunately, the F-35 followed a similar path as the F-22; it is significantly behind schedule and over budget. This has caused some to question the USAF's ability to afford the full planned procurement of F-35s 5 In fact, the USAF has postponed hundreds of F-35s over the next five years and only plans on purchasing 172 the Air Force will not be able to rely on stealth alone and surprise will diminish, increasing the need for mass and maneuver. It will need aircraft in the sky to produce mass to overwhelm the enemy. Additionally, increased speed and range have added to maneuver. However, it is difficult to execute tactical maneuvers in relation to the enemy with limited aircraft. While the Air Force has not defined a specific fifth generation fighter requirement, it appears that the Air Force will fall short of its needs, especially in the next decade, as F-35 procurement slips farther to the right.
Fighter Pilot Shortage
To manage rated manning, the USAF utilizes redline/blueline charts. These charts are produced semi-annually and show expected requirements compared to projected inventory. The redline is requirements and the blueline is inventory for Lieutenant Colonels and below. 10 Thus, the redline above the blueline indicates a projected shortage of pilots. Department of Defense (DoD) and USAF UAS Guidance
The Department of Defense and USAF consider unmanned systems a key enabler in the current and future force structure. As such, the DoD and USAF published guidance and roadmaps for unmanned systems. This guidance includes unmanned systems for every domain and commonality for joint operations. In order to achieve commonality, the DoD provided guidelines for future UAS procurement and the USAF further refined UAS objectives for future systems. One of the main themes throughout DoD and USAF documents is autonomy.
UAS Autonomy
The USAF Chief Scientist calls for moving from manned to remotely piloted aircraft and from control to autonomy over the next twenty years. 14 By moving to 7 systems that are more autonomous the DoD and USAF will capitalize on increased manpower efficiencies, reduce communications risks, reduce risk to life, and ensure seamless teaming with manned systems. The DoD defines four levels of automation (reference Table 1 ) as a common reference for the services. A human operator makes all decisions. The system has no autonomous control of its environment although it may have information-only responses to sensed data.
Human Delegated
The vehicle can perform many functions independently of human control when delegated to do so. This level encompasses automatic controls, engine controls, and other low-level automation that must be activated or deactivated by human input and must act in mutual exclusion of human operation.
Human Supervised
The system can perform a wide variety of activities when given top-level permissions or direction by a human. Both the human and the system can initiate behaviors based on sensed data, but the system can do so only if within the scope of its currently directed tasks.
Fully Autonomous
The system receives goals from humans and translates them into tasks to be performed without human interaction. A human could still enter the loop in an emergency or change the goals, although in practice there may be significant time delays before human intervention occurs.
Today's unmanned systems require a high degree of human interaction. 16 For example, two pilots and a sensor operator in a ground control station operate a single MQ-9. When the MQ-9 is forward deployed, a local ground control station provides control for takeoff and landing, adding to the manpower requirement. Several years ago, to increase the MQ-1 and MQ-9 combat air patrols (CAPs) to 65 in support of combatant commander's needs, the USAF estimated a total force requirement of 1,750
pilots. 17 The manpower requirements are staggering for a system that, while performing outstandingly, can only operate in a non-contested environment. The goal of the DoD is to reduce this manpower burden through automation. The Air Force decided in February 2012 to cease development of the MQ-X. 27 The cancellation is likely due to several factors to include tightening budgets, increased acquisition costs, and the inability to strike a balance between desired capabilities and cost. This leaves future medium-sized UAS development at a crossroads. The USAF has decided to take a "wait and see" approach and observe the outcome of the U.S.
Navy's Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS)
program before deciding on future UAS development. The research world is actively testing level 3 automation. The U.S. Army is pursuing manned-unmanned systems integration capability (MUSIC) to control several
UASs from a single control station. 29 A manned helicopter could also control the UASs and receive the UAS sensor video. In coordination with MUSIC, Kutta Technologies formally launched a manned/unmanned teaming kit to allow Level 3+ control of a UAS while still flying his or her own aircraft 30 . Additionally, Utah State University has tested two small UASs flying in formation as a flight lead and wingman. 31 These are a few of many examples of level 3 automation research and development projects.
Manned-unmanned teaming and loyal wingman operations require level 3 automation. Several challenges exist for a UAS to fly formation with a manned aircraft.
The first challenge is for the UAS to fly formation while avoiding the manned aircraft.
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The second challenge is for the UAS to avoid other aircraft. 34 The lead aircraft flew a pre-programmed route while the follower aircraft tracked the lead aircraft and maintained a formation scheme. A low-intensity conflict, such as counter insurgency, requires precision strike and persistence. In this scenario, air superiority is usually a given, allowing freedom of maneuver with low risk for any platform. In order to prosecute a target when it appears, aircraft must either remain on station for long periods or be readily available. The MQ-1/9 provides persistence through long loiter times. Fighters provide persistence through aerial refueling and speed to cover greater distances. Precision strike is required to destroy soft targets, such as buildings and vehicles, while reducing collateral damage.
Any range of platforms can provide these required capabilities.
A high-intensity conflict, such as an A2/AD scenario, requires precision strike, force extension, and survivability. Aircraft must gain air superiority and be able to 14 survive modern surface-to-air missiles (SAM) systems and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) within an IADS. Additionally, aircraft must have precision strike capability with larger weapons to defeat hardened targets, such as bunkers. The MQ-1 and MQ-9 are not considered survivable in A2/AD scenarios and cannot carry weapons larger than five hundred pounds. Overall, the MQ-1/9 has a low probability of both success and survival in a high-intensity conflict. The F-35 and F-22 have a high probability of success and high survivability, assuming enough fighters are available.
It is difficult to quantify risk when comparing manned and unmanned aircraft.
How does one measure the risk between the loss of life and mission failure? Significant loss of life is high risk, as is the loss of a large number of unmanned platforms with no return of effectiveness. Ultimately, the USAF accepts risk to win America's wars and for the near future must accept the risk to life for high-intensity conflicts. Risk must balance the loss of life with the loss of large numbers of essential unmanned systems.
By defining risk as such, one can compare risk versus success for platforms in a highintensity A2/AD scenario. Combat Aircraft System. 37 One of the main concerns, and sometimes the most difficult task for air-to-air or air-to-ground weapons employment, is target identification.
There is valid concern in the Department of Defense (DoD) . Since the MQ-16 is simply dropping on coordinates for all air-to-ground weapons delivery, it must be able to transmit the coordinates loaded in its system back to the manned aircraft. The manned aircraft can then provide release authority. While this sounds complex, such a capability already exists in Link-16 and would simply need to be incorporated into the software of the MQ-16 and host aircraft.
Aerial Refueling
The MQ-16 must possess an aerial refueling capability in order to be an effective tactical UAS. The Air Force and Navy recognize the importance of force extension for future UASs. Moreover, force extension is a pre-requisite for most current tactical Air
Force missions. Northrop Grumman in coordination with the Navy is testing the X-47B
with plans to demonstrate autonomous aerial refueling with Navy "probe and drogue"
and Air Force "boom-receptacle" systems in 2014. 39 is a viable option to tackle two of the Air Force's strategic challenges.
